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The Backdrop
Throughout the late 1920s and into the 1930s Japanese nationalists exerted
more and more control over the Japanese government and promoted the divine
right of Japan to conquer Asia and unify it. Japan's increasingly expansionist
policies brought her directly into conflict with neighboring Russia and China.
Japanese actions included her 1905 war with Russia, attacks such as the invasion
of Manchuria in 1931, and finally, the full-scale invasion of China in July
1937.
In response to international condemnation of the 1931 conquest
of Manchuria and the establishment of the Manchukuo puppet government, in 1933
Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. In 1935, Japan renounced the London
Naval Conference which had limited the size of Japan's naval forces. The 1937
Japanese aggression against China was condemned by the League of Nations, the
U.S., Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands. These states, had territorial
interests or colonies in Southeast Asia and had become increasingly alarmed
at Japan's military power and her willingness to use it. In July 1939, the U.S.
terminated the 1911 U.S.-Japan commercial treaty, which showed official disapproval
and, more concretely, allowed the U.S. to impose trade restrictions as additional
pressure. These efforts did not deter Japan from continuing its war in China
and signing both the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany and the Tripartite
Pact with Germany and Italy. |
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The Tripartite Pact, war with China, and Japan's withdrawal
from the League of Nations led the U.S. to embargo scrap metal and gasoline
shipments to Japan and close the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping.
In 1941,
Japan moved into northern Indochina. The U.S. responded by freezing Japan's
assets in the U.S., and beginning a complete oil embargo.
Oil was Japan's most
crucial imported resource; more than 80 percent of Japan's oil imports came
from the United States. To secure its oil supplies, and other resources, Japanese
planners had long been looking south, especially to the Dutch East Indies. The
Navy was certain any attempt to seize this region would bring the U.S. into
the war.
In August of 1941, Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe proposed a
summit with President Roosevelt to discuss differences but Roosevelt replied
that Japan must leave China before a summit meeting could be held. |
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The War
In July 1941 the Imperial Japanese Navy informed Emperor Showa
that the navy's reserve oil would run out in two years unless another oil source
was provided. On September 6, 1941, at the second Imperial Conference concerning
an attack on occidental colonies, the Japanese leaders met to consider the attack
plans prepared by Imperial General Headquarters, one day after the emperor had
scolded General Sugiyama about the lack of success of the invasion of China
and the chances of victory against Occident.
It was decided to commence hostilities
against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands if the empire's
requirements for access to resources were not resolved through diplomatic negotiations
by October 10, 1941.
Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe argued for more negotiations
and possible concessions to avert war. Military leaders like Hideki Tojo,Hajime
Sugiyama and IJN Chief of Staff Osami Nagano argued time had run out and additional
negotiations wouldn't bear any fruit. Tojo argued yielding to the American demand
to withdraw troops would wipe out all the fruits of the "China incident",
endanger Manchukuo, and jeopardize the governing of Korea. |
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On October 16, 1941, Konoe resigned and proposed prince Naruhiko
Higashikuni, who was also the choice of the Army and the Navy, as his successor.
Hirohito choose Hideki Tojo instead, worried, as he told to Konoe, about having
the Imperial House being held responsible for a war against Western powers.
On November 3, 1941, Nagano presented a detailed plan for the
attack on Pearl Harbor to Hirohito. On 5 November, Hirohito approved the plan
for a war against the United States, Great Britain and Holland which was scheduled
to start at the beginning of December if no significant changes were achieved
through diplomacy.
On 30 November 1941, prince Nobuhito Takamatsu warned his brother
Hirohito that the Navy felt the Empire could not fight more than two years against
United States and wished to avoid war. After consulting with Koichi Kido (who
advised him to take his time until he was convinced) and Tojo, the emperor then
called Shimada and Nagano who reassured him that the war would be successful.
On December 1, Hirohito finally sanctioned a "war against United States,
Great Britain and Holland" in another imperial conference. |
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